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The Supreme Court of Canada decision R. v. Latimer' has created
an unprecedented level of interest in mandatory minimum sentences for
murder. The accused, Robert Latimer, has generally not been seen as
comporting with widely shared, if inaccurate, typologies of killers. Thus, he
has come to be portrayed by many as the victim of a harsh and inflexible
statute and as an example of the misuse of Crown discretion. Lost in the
confusion has been a clear picture of the victim and an understanding of the
purposes and methods of the criminal law in protecting vulnerable citizens.

1 [20011 I S.C.R. 3 [hereinafter Latimer).
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Latimerhasresulted in attention being focused on mandatory penalties, but
through a lens that will distort the analysis of the complex moral and legal
issues of fixed sentences and that vill cause further harm to the interests of
people with disabilities.
Following a review of the decision of the Court, this article will
examine the broad implications of Latimer for people with disabilities.
Using sources drawn from both academic journals and other fora such as
disability rights advocacy organization publications, this article will,
wherever possible, give voice to the concerns of the disabled. It will
attempt to explain the multi-faceted injuries, which the legal and media
treatment of the case have inflicted on the disabled. This article covers
some of the issues directly related to mandatory minimum sentences for
murder, although it argues that Latimerisan unsuitable basis for addressing
the many problems inherent in these sentencing practices. The final portion
of the article presents a limited plan for a parliamentary response to the
setbacks caused by the Latimer case through amending the CriminalCode.2
II.

THE SUPREME COURT: INEVITABLE DECLARATIONS
AND SOME BACKPEDALING

The Supreme Court of Canada closed the judicial chapter of the
Latimer case when it rejected all of the accused's arguments, upholding his
conviction for second-degree murder as well as the statutory sentence of
life imprisonment with no parole eligibility for ten years Seven years
earlier, Latimer had methodically carried out his plan to kill his daughter,
Tracy, by poisoning her with carbon monoxide. From the beginning of his
involvement with the criminal justice system, Latimer had interaliaclaimed
that he should be able to use the residual necessity defence. Following his
second conviction for murder, he also contended that the mandatory
sentence for his crime was cruel and unusual punishment. In refusing to
countenance these submissions, the Court drewwhat were surely inevitable
conclusions, in light of the threat that the accused's contentions presented

2 R.S.C. 19S5, c. C-46.

3 The author has discussed the Court's decision more etensively n HA. Kaiser. "LaUtimer
The
End of Judicial Im olement and an UnsatisfactoryDeFacto Bginingof the ClemenciPreces" (2.39)
39 C.R. (5th) 42. In the same edition, three other authors ali discuss this controversial easzEometmes
taking issue %,ithhis contribution: B. Sneiderman, "R v. Latimer. Juries and Mandatory Penalties"

(2001) 39 C.R. (5th) 29; D. Stuart, "A Hard Case Makes For Too Harsh Lav." (.I1)39 C.R, (5th);
58 and A. Manson, "Motivation, the Supreme Court and Mandatory Sentencing for Murder" ('491)
39 C.R. (5th) 65.
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to the section 15 CanadianCharterof Rights and Freedoms4 guarantee of
"equal protection and equal benefit of the law."
Despite the generally sound reasoning of the Court's holdings, the
decision does not capitalize on the full potential ofjudicial pronouncements
for people with disabilities to articulate forcefully and unequivocally the
equal value of their lives. As Melinda Jones and Lee Ann Marks have
recognized:
Judicial decision-making has an importance to the legitimisation of values and principles.
Where judges develop their ideas informed by an inclusive view of human rights and
entitlements, their words can have impact well beyond the specific case that they are
adjudicating.'

Although, some passages of the Latimer decision do have a strong
resonance for disabled people, other parts actually permit an erosion of
some of the limited hortatory value of the decision. The closing comments
on the suitability of an application for executive clemency are particularly
noteworthy for their retreatist tone and effects.
The decision reiterates the Perka et al. v. The Queen' version of
necessity: (1) there must be imminent peril, (2) there can be no reasonable
legal alternative, and (3) there must be proportionality between the harm
caused and the harm avoided. In Latimer,the Court decided that the first
two criteria should be assessed on a modified objective standard while the
third would be measured on a strict objective standard. The Court
determined that none of these requirements were met in the Latimer case.
There was no danger to Latimer, or more importantly to his daughter, given
that Tracy could have benefited from a feeding tube and better pain
management. Reasonable legal alternatives were available in the situation,
but were rejected by the accused! Finally, there could be no basis for the
proportionality element, as the harm inflicted by the killing "was
immeasurably more serious than the pain resulting from Tracy's operation,

4Part I of the ConstitutionAct, 1982 being Schedule B to the CanadaAct 1982 (U.K.), 1982,
c.lI

[hereinafter Charter].
5M.Jones & LA. Basser Marks, "Valuing People Through Law - Whatever Happened
to
Marion?" in "Explorations on Law and Disability in Australia," (2000) 17:2 L in Context 147 at 176.
6 [19841 2 S.C.R. 232.
7Supra note 1 at 24.
8Ibid.
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which her father sought to avoid." Fortunately, the Court did draw some
attention to the equality concerns which were so conspicuously raised by
the case:
-we must remain avware of the need to reTect the life, dignity and equahty of all the
individuals affected by the act in question. The fact that the 'ictim vas dtsabled rather than
able-bodied does not affect our conclusion that the three requirements for the defense of
necessity had no air of reality here.1

In a civilized society, the combination of necessity and murder must
always be a dim theoretical possibility at best. One should have to strain to
think of hypothetical situations where there is even a chance of congruence
between this defence and the crime. Jonathan Rogers has cited the need to
be sure of the moral justifiability of providing such a defence to intentional
killing: "If the Court was to authorize, for the first time in legal history, the
killing of an innocent human being," he wrote, "then one might expect it to
be confident that this was the morally right thing to do.""i t
The Latimer case could not meet the standard of a confident
assertion of a moral entitlement to kill. To have accepted any variation of
the necessity argument on these facts would have allowed for an
unprecedented erosion of the protective function of the criminal law in
Canadian society.
Latimer's other grounds of appeal against conviction were also
unacceptable to the Court. The trial judge's delay in determining whether
necessity would go to the jury did not affect the fairness of the trial."2
Latimer's attempt to combine this allegedshortcomingwith the triajudge's
possible equivocation over the role of thejury in sentencing as a cumulative
discouragement of jury nullification was also not given any credence by the
Court. The Court held that "the accused is not entitled to a trial that
increases the possibility of jury nullification.""3
Once the grounds of appeal against conviction had been disposed
of, the Court had to consider the challenge against the sentence of life
imprisonment imposed on the accused through the operation of section 745
of the CriminalCode. Latimer did not attack the general constitutionality

9INd at 26.
10
bid
11
12
13

J. Rogers, "Necessity, Private Defence and the Killing of Mary" (Z01) Crim. LR. 515 at 521.
Supra note I at 33.
Ibid
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of the mandatory life sentence for murder, nor did he pursue the section 12
tactical option of suggesting that the sentence was grossly disproportionate
in reasonable hypothetical circumstances. The Court only had to determine
whether or not this was a case of cruel and unusual punishment in the
particular circumstances of the accused's crime.
The many aggravating features of Latimer's killing of his daughter
ensured that he could not invoke constitutional doctrine to overturn a
sentence that Parliament insisted upon. The Court noted the potential
deterrent effect of this sentence, but emphasized the vulnerability of the
victim in a situation where the accused had used a "high degree of planning
and premeditation." 4 The accused's "initial attempts to conceal his actions,
his lack of remorse, his position of trust""5 further influenced the Court's
rejection of the disproportionality argument, ensuring its unacceptability
on individual and utilitarian levels.
Had the Court been more vigorous in its articulation of equality
concerns, while still rejecting the necessity and section 12 arguments on
conventional legal and constitutional bases, the decision in Latimer might
have been laudable from the perspective of people with disabilities. The
economy of the pronouncements on section 15 was only exacerbated by the
Court's tacit encouragement of an application for the royal prerogative of
mercy. Oddly, the Court went so far as to suggest, with certainty, that the
government would examine "all of the underlying circumstances
surrounding the tragedy of Tracy Latimer,' 16 and that the publicity
surrounding the accused's several judicial involvements
had brought
"consequential agony for him and his family."17
I have previously argued that Latimer is an implausible case for
executive clemency, despite the apparent support for it by the Court. The
case seems to be inconsistent with the policies applied by the National
Parole Board. Moreover, government policy statements on the need to
protect children and people with disabilities appear to directly collide with
the facts of Latimer.'8
Popular support (which will be discussed infra) aside, this prediction
seems to be shared by other academic commentators. Carolyn Strange

14

Ibi.

5

i Ib

at 40.

16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
18 Kaiser, supra note 3 at 51 - 56.
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concludes that an extension of the royal prerogative would "stir unpalatable
charges of politicized justice into the controversy.""' Kent Roach is more
ambivalent: first doubting that Parliament will revisit mandatory penalties
for murder, then suggesting that the accused's "sentence will more likely be
commuted," although contending that the latter form of relief "may depend
on the outcome of a political popularity contest which pits his claim for
sympathy against that of Tracy Latimer." The potential for a remedy for
the accused in this post-judicial forum, however unlikely, ensures that the
case will continue to be the locus of attention for the minimum mandatory
sentence for murder. More disturbingly for people with disabilities, the
same currents that animated the necessity and disproportionality arguments
in the Court and that devalued their humanity there will continue to be at
the forefront in the ensuing public and Cabinet debate. The stakes for
people with disabilities will continue to be high and an awareness of all the
dimensions of this struggle should be developed now.
III. FRAGILE ADVANCES AND THE POTENTIAL FOR
PROGRESS
For people with disabilities, considering the implications of the
Latimer case is an exercise fraught with sadness. Nonetheless, this
atmosphere of desperation must be transcended or the disabled community
will suffer even greater losses.
As with other groups living in conditions of inequality, Latimer
reminds one that any gain can be illusory and that vigilance, rather than
complacency, must characterize the stance of equality promoters. The
editorial of a recent edition of Canadian Journal of Women and the Law
speaks of the fragility of any apparent alteration of the status quo. It can be
read mutatis mutandis for people with disabilities after Latiner,although
it should be remembered that the influence of gender is clearly present at
one level or another in the accused's murder of his daughter. The editorial
notes that "even when the legal system delivers some good news for
women, it is rarely unequivocal or secure against backlash,
misunderstanding, or whittling down."'

19C Strange, "Mercy for Murderers? A HW~torical Perspvctiwe in the Royal Prerepatise
of
Mercy" (2001) 64 Sask L Rev. 559 at 570.
20

K. Roach, "Crime and Punishment in the Ltincr Case" (2001) 64 Sask L Rev. 469 at 4.5-S6,

21 "Editorial," (2000) 12:2 C.J.V.L
at v.
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Occasionally, there have been glimpses of appropriate attitudes in
the response of the legal system to Tracy's murder, but even during these
moments of lucidity and hope, threatening forces have emerged to set back
the cause of equality. Yvonne Peters has summarized the extent of the
assault on equality gains represented by the Latimer case:
After years of fighting for social issues such as the right to live, work, and participate in the
community as equal citizens, disability rights activists were taken aback by the relentless,
passionate, public-wide debate on the fundamental issue of whether it is legally and morally
acceptable for a father to take the life of his severely disabled daughter. Even more
disturbing is the belief by much of the public that Latimer performed a humane and noble
act in killing his daughter, Tracy.22

This article next considers the comprehensive damage inflicted by
Latimer,before returning to coping and resistance strategies that should be
advocated before Parliament.
IV.

THE SHALLOWNESS OF DEMOCRATIC PROMISES
Democracy announces its presence by a few fundamental traits of character, among them a
reasonably honest discussion of public issues,
the accountability of the governors to the
3
governed, and equal protection under the law.2

Lewis Lapham's emphasis on equal protection under the law as a
central feature of democracy seems virtually unarguable. The Latimer case
demonstrates how easily Canada will abandon such societal underpinnings
in favour of distorted images of disability, confusion over fundamental legal
concepts, and saccharine, yet dangerous, sentimentality. One should not
sound the alarm bells prematurely, but there are portends of faltering, if
not doom, for our democracy in Latimer.
As the Court has said in R. v. Oakes,24 "the values and principles
essential to a free and democratic society" include "respect for the inherent
dignity of the human person, commitment to social justice and equality......
In R. v. Zundel,' the Court noted that the Charter:

22 Y. Peters, "Reflections on the Latimer Case: The Rationale for a Disability Rights Lens"
(2001) 64 Sask. L Rev. 631 at 632.
23LH.Lapham, The WihforKings: Democracy at Bay (New York: Grove, 1993)
at 12 [emphasis
added]
24 [198611 S.C.R. 103.
25

Ibid. at 136.
26(199212 S.C.R. 731.
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...providesusvAth indications as tovwhich %aluesgoto the vcrycore of our plittcal structure,
A democratic society capable of giving effect to the Crarter'sguarantees tsone vhitch stracs
toward creating a community committed to equality, liberty and human dignity.'

Subsequent to the Latimer decision, the Court has recognized the
role of the courts in protecting vulnerable communities through "antimajoritarian judicial review."' The Court's decision in United States v.
Burns's declares that it is the duty of the courts to bolster democratic values
that are under attack. The Court approved statements by Arthur
Chaskalson, President of the Constitutional Court of South Africa:
The very reason for establishing the new legal order, and for westing the rxer of judicial
review of all legislation in the courts, was to protect the rights of minorities and othcrsv-ho
cannot protect their rights adequately through the democratic process. Those vho are
entitled to claim this protection include the social outcasts and marginaltcd people of our
society. It is only if there is a willingness to protect the v.orst and weakest amongst us that all
of us can be secure that our own rights will be protceted2

Whether the courts have adequately safeguarded the citizenry,
including people with disabilities through their various decisions in the
Latimersagais somewhat doubtful. As noted previously, even the otherwise
sound judgment of the Court contains passages that tend to dilute this
protective function. However, the point remains that the many direct and
more subtle slights on people with disabilities that have characterized the
Latimer case should activate warning signals for democracy.
The Latimer case strikes at the heart of the guarantee of equality
for people with disabilities, and hence at the "very core of our political
structure." As Catherine Frazee urged in 1995:
Whether or not we have disabilities, whether or not w.e ha%e "severe" disabilities, vhether
or not our circumstances are similar to those of Traey Latimer, we consider Traci lUtimcr
to be our equal. Because she was. In her humanity, in her entitlements, in hercittzcnshlp, hc
3
was anyone's equalO

27 Ibi. at 806.
28

K Roach, "Editorial: Burns and Rafay" (2001) 44 Crim. LQ. 437 at 433L

29 [200111 S.C.R. 283.
Ibid. at 324.

30
31

C. Frazee, "Our Lives Are Worth Liing, Comments from a Vigil for Tracy Latimcr"ArchAFC
13:3 (1995) 1,online: Council of Canadiansvith Disabilities <http?Avu'spcs mb cal-cad ch9 html>
(date accessd: 21 February 2001).
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This fundamental acknowledgment of the equality rights of the
victim has appeared in some of the judicial pronouncements on the case,
although it cannot be seen as the dominant theme in the jurisprudence, let
alone in the media reports. For example, at the Saskatchewan Court of
Appeal, Mr. Justice Tallis contrasted the handling of Latimer with what
would happen were the victim not disabled:
In this situation it is a fair inference that such a decision [Tracy Latimer's murderI would
never have been suggested or considered if Tracywere not handicapped and in extreme pain.
This difference in approach between handicapped and non-handicapped children directly
reflects a sense that the life of a handicapped2 child is of significantly less value than the life
of a non-handicapped child in extreme pain.'

At the Court, there were only brief notations of the section 15(1)
equality rights of the disabled as informing the constitutional considerations
relevant to community standards in "evaluating the gravity of the act."33
One recalls the distancing of the Court from even these statements in the
later supportive obiterpronouncements on the availability of an application
for executive clemency.
The Council of Canadians with Disabilities (CCD) had emphasized
the threats to equality in their factum to the Court:
The equality guarantees in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms and human rights statutes
in all Canadian jurisdictions have been introduced for the precise purpose of responding to
the stereotypes and stigmatization which are involved in the arguments advanced in this case
and which are reflected in some of the public reaction which the Appellant's conviction has
engendered."

Latimeris a case about equality and the willingness to infringe upon
the entitlements ofpeople with disabilities, despite the declared importance
of equality in Canadian democracy. Its message is that there is a propensity
to engage in rhetoric about this fundamental feature of democracy, rather
than a deep reverence for the principle of equality. How this diminution of
such fundamental rights occurred so readily must be considered.

32
33

R.v. Latimer (1995), 99 C.C.C. (3d) 481 at 519 (Sask. C.A.).

Supra note I at 22.
34 Latimer, ibid. (Council of Canadians with Disabilities' factum) [hereinafter Factunl.
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IMAGES OF DISABILITY: AN UNFAVOURABLE
CONTRAST WITH THE ACCUSED

It was easy to kill Tracy because of her disability, but her physical
defenselessness is only part of the explanation. Tracy's disability allowed
her to be devalued, which made her especially vulnerable. The
rationalization of her death has been facilitated by the variegated images
of disability which have been fostered by the accused and repeated
enthusiastically in the news media, subtly penetrating the psyche of many
otherwise logical and caring Canadians. Frazee called these forces "a
Trojan horse within our popular culture ... forces that operate not at the
level of reason but instead 'more like a computer virus ... [altering] our

programming without our knowledge."'" Other writers have eloquently
explained how these influences actually function to debase people with
disabilities once they are implanted.
Many erroneous assumptions have clouded public perceptions and
facilitated a "pernicious example of disability-based discrimination '""
represented by the accused's defence that he killed his daughter out of
necessity. As Heather Heavin has argued, the complex devaluation
processes displayed in this case involve the creation and assertion of a
supposedly objective measurement scale involving quality of life assessment
norms. As a result, it became possible for the victim to be placed at the
low end of the hierarchy, as if one were dealing with a simple question of
fact. Consequently, there was an "erosion of the principle that all life is of
equal value"' Sand the removal of Tracy's entitlement to the protection of
the law. The case for the accused was, in addition, based upon the
legitimacy of Latimer's perception of his daughter's pain and her ability to
tolerate this aspect of her disability."' This assumption that surrogate
decision makers should be allowed to make all decisions for persons with
disabilities, including whether they should live or die, has structured the

35C. Frazee, "Under the Microscope: Diss ctang Law and Medicine in the Diibihty Ri3hts
Laboratory" (Public Lecture, Dalhousie University Heahh Lai, Institute. Hahfa., No-.a Sta
February 2001) [unpublished].
36
Peters, supra note 22 at 641.

1)

37H.Heatin, "Human Rights Issues in R. v. Latmicr and Their Significance
for Dr--abled
Canadians" (2001) 64 Sask. L Rev. 613.
3Ibid.at 61.
39

Ibid. at 618-19,
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defence of this crime as well as the public response." Through these
mechanisms, as Peters has discussed, the victim eventually becomes defined
as the problem, whose less valuable, even "sub-human or alien,"'" life is
subject to end when an able-bodied parent determines that it is
appropriate.
The insidious images of disability, which are so "highly prejudicial
to the personal and collective claims to equality, health and justice for
people with disabilities"42 are that "Tracy is consistently depicted as
hopelessly flawed, and hopelessly ill." 43 As well:
- when Tracy Latimer was described, it was almost exclusively in terms of her disability.
Little is mentioned of what she enjoyed, of how she interacted with other children, of what
she did in her school program. By describing her only in terms of her surgeries, her pain,
her disabilities, Tracy Latimer was dehumanized in the media."

How and why were these negative and limited portrayals of Tracy
circulated so successfully? It may well be that widespread and deep-seated
prejudices against people with disabilities in Canada have given such
reportage currency. Heidi Lanz has argued this point:
When this portrayal of Tracy is contrasted with the typical depiction of Robert Latimer as
a devoted parent and a well-liked, well-respected member of the community, it becomes
painfully evident that the mass media is at once mirroring and perpetuating the common
public perception of people with severe disabilities as somehow less-than-human beings
condemned to a burdensome, pain-filled existence. 5

Indeed, Ruth Klinkhammer and David Taras have concluded that,
despite some coverage to the contrary, the accused had enjoyed a media
victory, even to the point of undoing the decision of the Court.
"[Kiinkhammer and Taras] contend that the sympathetic media coverage

40

Ibid. at 620-21.

41 Supra note 22 at 642.
42 Frazee, supra note 35.
43 C. M. Eckstein, "One of Our Children is Dead" Ability Network Magazine
(Winter 1996- 97)
5, online: Compassionate Healthcare Network <http:lwww.chninternational.com/v5n2p37.html> (date
accessed: 21 February 2001).
44 D. Sobsey, "The Media and Robert Latimer"Archtype 13:3 (August 1995) 8, online: Council
for Canadians with Disabilities <http://www.pcs.mb.ca/-ccd/ch7.html> (date accessed: 21 February
2001).
45 H.L Lanz, "Disabling Images and the Dangers of Public Perception: A Commentary on
the
Media's 'Coverage' of the Latimer Case" (1998) 9:3 ConstitutionalForum 66 at 70.
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awarded to Robert Latimer, to some degree, 'overturned' the Supreme
Court's ruling in Latimer and the message that the Court wanted to send." "
The accused, in contrast to his victim, "is positioned well withinperhaps right on-the normative bull's-eye," , to the point where, despite
being an admitted, unrepentant child killer, his acts are portrayed as
merciful4' and compassionate. Klinkhammer and Taras elaborate on the
mysterious attractiveness of the accused, pointing to the media celebration
of his "ordinariness" and the depictions of "Latimer on his farm in the cold
Saskatchewan vinter."49 The simple pictures of the "stolid Canadian
farmer" on his land are said to symbolize "the Canadian preoccupation
with surviving in a harsh land [where] Latimer perfectly fits the survivor
role." 50
As Dick Sobsey has pointed out, the skewing of news coverage has
permitted many distortions that are highly favourable to the accused:
misuse of language, disputed facts being presented as truth, inconsistencies
in the accused's story being accepted solely from his perspective, the
omission of relevant information and the blurring of issues, as well as the
erasure of the victim's humanity.5 1 The victim's experience, conversely, has
largely been ignored. The media have seldom engaged in a deconstruction
of a supposed love that kills its object. There is no mention of the trust that
was so egregiously betrayed.
Public attitudes towards people vth disabilities and the ready
exploitation of such prejudices have ensured that Robert Latimer is
consistently viewed as the victim, despite his flagrant criminality. His

46 R. Klinkhammer & D. Taras, "Mercy or Murder? Media Co :rage of the Robert Latimer
Supreme Court Decision" (2001) 64 Sask. L Rev. 573 at 574.
47

Frazee, supra note 35.

43 Perhaps the apotheosis of this depiction was reached in Alberta, vherc the Provinclal
Mucum
sponsored an exhibit "Anno Domini: Jesus Through the Centuries," shwozng Rehbrt Latimer as a

modem example of the beatitudes. See. letter from Zuhy Saeed, Past President, Alberta As Izlatton
for Community Living, online: Canadian Association for Community Ling
<http:fA,,w.wae.cachcaienglish!altamuseum.html> (date accessed: 21 February 2 01). In the same en,
but beyond the pale even of thisexhibit, orthe flurryofsuprortia petitions. isthegrix,,.inglistof ople
vwho have volunteered to serve part of the accuscd's sentence. See llo!untcersto s5ne tmcfarrfrt

Latmer, online: Robert Latimer <http:1Ave%,,.robertatimer.comiailtimc.htm> (date acCss:do 9
September 2001). As of the time of writing, the website RobertLatmer.com listed ower 170 patentsal
surrogate prisoners.
49 Supra note 46 at 5S5.
50

Ibi at 5S6.

51 Supra note 44.
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murder of his daughter is thereby excused or justified in the eyes of many,
and he is depicted as being inappropriately and unjustly punished. The
victory of the anti-equality argument, at least in terms of public perception,
has been virtually complete.
VI.

IMPLICATIONS FOR PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES
Tracy's tragic death has been a watershed event in the history of Canadians with disabilities.
Her murder has awakened most people with disabilities from an apathy that had been caused
by a decade of improvements in our quality of life.52
[Latimer] is tragic for persons with disabilities because they have endured the blunt truth that
prejudice and discrimination still figure prominently in today's society.53

The above passages illustrate the perspective of most people with
disabilities and their allies regarding the Latimer case. The direct
implications were perhaps most acutely felt by Canadians with cerebral
palsy, especially those with conditions similar to Tracy's. It is estimated that
there are approximately five thousand Canadian children who are disabled
in the same way and to the same degree as Tracy. 4
For some observers, there are parallels between the Nazi death
camps and the manner of and rationale for killing Tracy:
People with disabilities are murdered in the name of kindness more often than in hatred.
Several hundred thousand Europeans with disabilities were gassed in Hitler's euthanasia
program. In the first stage of the policy, somewhere around 8,000 children were "humanely"
put to death at the behest of their families--only Aryans need apply."

Sobsey has described the comparisons more extensively, noting that
the inception of the Nazi genocide was marked by the special interest taken
by Hitler in the "severely handicapped son" of a Leipzig family, who was
killed by Hitler's personal physician, Karl Brandt.

52 D. Martin, "High-Profile Cases Like Latimer Focus Attention: Disabled Vulnerable to
Violence" Winnipeg Free Press (6 February 1997) A13, online: Council for Canadians with Disabilities
<http://www.pes.mb.ca/-ccdAvfp6297.html> (date accessed: 21 February 2001).
53 Peters, supra note 22 at
643.
C. Cooper, A Mother Speaks For Those Who Cannot Speak For Themselves, online:
Compassionate Healthcare Network <http:/www.chninternational.com/tracy.htm> (date accessed:
21 February 2001).
55 J. Derksen, Deadly Compassion, FearsomeKindness:Murdered in the Name of Kindness,
online:
Council of Canadians with Disabilities <http:/Avww.pcs.mb.ca/-ccd/Ch8.html> (date accessed: 21
February 2001).
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No one lmows the number of people %,ho v ere killcd in this program, Most Eugsest that
the number was about 275,000.... Before mass c'termination made carbon monot-de
canisters practical, gassings were commonly conducted using the e,.haust from trucLs2

The links to Nazi inhumanity that have been drawn by many people
in the disability movement are neither surprising nor inapposite. Some
observers who are more sympathetic to the accused accept the inexorability
of such comparisons. For example, Barney Sneiderman, who concedes the
accused's crime but deplores the sentence he received,' anticipates the
reaction to any proposal for the adoption of a mercy-killing defence
inspired by Latimer.
... any proposal for a mercy-killing defence vould be met vath an impas.oned stream of
protest from disabled circles, invoking Hitler's so-called euthanasia programme as its
historical precedent. As it was, voices from the disabled community quicMy branded the
[Special Senate] Committee's proposed amendment as a licence for the mass killing of the
disabled by their care-givers!'

What has been particularly striking after Latimeris the tenor of the
reaction from people with disabilities. The response is not abstract or
distanced from the killing of Tracy. The literature is permeated with a
palpable fear and an accompanying resolve to continue the struggle, not
merely for the conventional ideals of legal equality, but also for simple
safety. When the level of concern about a crime and its prosecution reaches
this stage, one begins to recognize the enormous destructive potential of
Latimer and the need for a respectful and reassuring remedy. As
demonstrated by the follovng samples of commentary, the reactions of
many advocates for people with disabilities are virtually unprecedented in
Canadian history:
Council of Canadians with Disbilities strongly belie%es that arguments advanced on behalf
of Mr. Latimer in this case involve a threat to the hes and ecurty of leop!e '.th
disabilities.5

56

Supra note 44.
57 B. Sneiderman, "Latimer in the Supreme Court: Ncc-csity, Compa!tonate Homicide, and
Mandatory Sentencing" (2001) 64 Sask. L Rev. 511 at 534.
5Jbid at 539.
59 Council of Canadians with Disabilities Press Release, "Latimer Appeal to Supreme Court
Watched by Disabled Canadians" (12 June 2000), online: Council of Canadians %wthDisabllitlcs
<http:fLv,-w,.pcs.mb.ca!-ccd!prl2600ohtml> (date accsscd: 21 February 201 |.
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Cases like the Latimercase show us that the very lives of people with disabilities, particularly
people with very severe disabilities, are in jeopardy.60

...
[P]eople with disabilities, particularly those who cannot articulate their own needs, arc
currently in great jeopardy. The attitudes expressed in the press about these people can only
increase their risk for violence and death. 6'
[The Latimer case] conveyed to us how very precarious our status in society is, if a life can
be taken and there is a kind of public endorsement of that act. It forced
us to realize we all
6
have to be involved in fighting this dangerous threat to our very lives. Z
This view [that a parent has a right to kill his disabled child], and the arguments advanced
by Mr. Latimer in his defence were seen as a direct threat to persons with disabilities who
rely on relatives or professional caregivers for their continued care."'

The foregoing quotations evince a rational and proportionate
reaction to a case in which there had been arguments for the necessity for
homicide and the appropriateness of providing a special lenient penalty for
killing a child with a disability. 6'
As will be seen infra, one can envisage changes to the criminal law

that will, in part, allay such fears. However, the erosion of confidence in
Canadian society generated by Latimer will not recede for a considerable
period, if it ever does.
VII. MANDATORY SENTENCING: THE PROBLEMS OUTSIDE
THE PARAMETERS OF LA TIMER
The issues raised by the policy of imposing mandatory minimum
sentencing, the sentencing issues argued by Latimer and the judicial

60 H.R. Scher, The Latimer Case: The Reflections of People with DisabiltiesIntroduction, online:
Council of Canadians with Disabilities: <http://www.pcs.mb.ca-ccdfchl.html>(date
February 2001).
61 Lanz,
supra note 45 at 70.

accessed: 21

62 C. Frazee, A Wake Up Call: an Interview with CatherineFrazee,online: Council of Canadians
with Disabilities <http:/Avww.pcs.mb.ca/-ccdlch4.html>.
63 Heavin, supra note 37 at 615.
64 As further evidence of the reality of these fears, in March 2001, a Montreal parent was accused
of killing a child with a disability. Although the facts seem to diverge from Latimer,the vulnerability of
the victim amplified the alarm initiated by that case. "A woman [Rachel Capra Craig] was charged with
first-degree murder yesterday after her severely disabled fourteen year-old daughter was found dead
in her home from what police called a deadly cocktail of medications," G. Hamilton, "Disabled Teen
Dies, Mother is Charged; Suffered Rett Syndrome" NationalPost(21 March 2001) Al; "[The accusedi
appeared briefly in the prisoner's box as debate swirled outside over whether she deserves compassion
or condemnation for allegedly taking her daughter's life." 1. Peretz, "Psychiatric Tests Ordered for
Mother" The Globe andMail (22 March 2001) A8.
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response have several meeting points, at least in the eyes of the media and
the public. It is sad and shameful that the murder of a child with disabilities
should be the crucible for the impetus to scrutinize the complex moral,
penological, and constitutional issues surrounding mandatory sentencing.
In many ways, it would be better if these connections had never been made
and if one did not have to consider the Latimer case. It is undesirable that
Latimer has spawned an interest in mandatory sentencing, because that case
is a wholly inappropriate vehicle for arguing against minimum sentences.
The singular attack on the equality of people with disabilities which
Latimer represents has been canvassed at a general level. However, the
objections to the case and its penumbra must be restated here to show the
invalidity of a Latimer-based attack on mandatory sentences. As a 1998
press release from the CCD urged, people with disabilities must continue to
insist on equality in this context as well:
The central issue is the rights of persons %ilthdiabilite s to equal protcctin of the l .;,
The
decision of the trial judge put disabled pcr-.ns at rnkiby not impasng the mandatvry
sentence for second degree murder," said [Hughl Scher, a Torknto lar.cr vath a di abihtv
Theresa Ducharne Chairperson of PEP [Peotple for Equal Parttcipation] a5.d,* Is m life
worth less simply because I ha~e a disabilit% Is my diabihtk a rca on for duminthimr the
protection I'm given by the law?"

This is not to say that the current mandatory sentencing regime for
murder (and other crimes) should not be reassessed outside the context of
Latimer. There are many who will argue that there are criminological
weaknesses as well as a harshness and pointlessness to some mandatory
minimum sentences. Unfortunately, the Latinercasedistorts this necessary
debate. Until a broader and more principled discussion ensues, beyond the
obfuscating conceptual dust-storm ofLatimer,the existing penalty structure
should be maintained.
Based upon the present legislative and judicial temperament, the
mandatory sentence of life imprisonment with minimum periods of parole
ineligibility for murder is unlikely to be interfered with by Parliament or the
judiciary in the near future, unless the disquiet over the Latimer sentence
continues to reverberate. At most, there may be some suggestion to change
the Criminal Code with regard to parole ineligibility, but one need only
recall the furore over the recent modest revisions to the "faint-hope" clause

65 Council of Canadians %,
ith Disabilities Press Release, -Coalition of Disabled Canadians Scck
Intervener Status in Latimer Appeal" (19 May l19S), online: Council of Canadians vith Dr;2bxhtes
<http:IiwvAkv.pcs.mb.ca-ccd/prescoal.html> (date acce;cd: 21 February 21)1
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to see how improbable it is that this harsh feature of our sentencing law will
be liberalized, even for first-degree murder.
The introduction of another type of homicide, with lesser penalties
when the victim is a person with a disability, would conspicuously offend
section 15 of the Charterand would be anathema to people with disabilities.
As the CCD maintained in their factum to the Court, in responding to the
accused's plea for a constitutional exemption, this sentence would be
horrific for "individuals with disabilities and/or those who are perceived to
be experiencing unacceptable levels of pain."' 6
In fact, at least insofar as those who are unable to formulate or
express views on the matter are concerned, their lives would rest entirely in
the hands of their parents or caregivers. If their situation became such that
(in the eyes of the caregiver) death was preferable to life, they could be
killed and the caregivers would not suffer the full sanction of the criminal
law.67

There is, in the final analysis, no basis on the facts of the Latimer
case for the advancement of the cause of reducing the range and extent of
minimum penalties for homicide, regardless of the importance of the
debate in other contexts. Canada cannot use the killing of a child with
disabilities as the foundation for a new sentencing regime. The inherent
violation of the equality obligation under the Charterand the diminution of
human value and dignity for people with disabilities is plainly unacceptable.
Cal Lambeth wrote:
Whatever ones own feelings about mandatory sentencing, it must be made clear to our
legislators that in determining [a] sentence for the perpetrator of a crime, that the nature of
the victim must not be allowed to be taken into account. That is to say, the court or jury shall
not be entitled to pass judgment on the quality of the life of the victim. To allow this to occur
would be to establish a hierarchy of rights and penalties for victims and perpetrators.

66

Factum, supra note 34.

67

1bid. See also Heathen Heavin, who wrote "the necessary effect of creating this
mercy killing
exemption is that it would deprive Tracy Latimer of her right to life without any concern for the
principles of fundamental justice, and it would also deprive her of the full protection of the criminal law
as provided for in s. 15 of the Charter."Supra note 37 at 628.
C. Lambeth, Issues Raised by the Latiner Case: Equality Rights Issues, online:
Council of
Canadianswith Disabilities <http:/www.pcs.mb.ca/-ccd/ch5.html> (date accessed: 21 February2001).
Many commentators have unabashedly drawn a link between the Latimer case and the unrelated
problems of minimum sentencing. An example of this are the comments of A. A. Borovoy: "Incredibly,
this proposal [the four-year minimum for firearms related offences] was introduced within a month after
a life sentence-no chance of parole for 10 years-was imposed upon Saskatchewan farmer Robert
Latimer for the mercy killing of his severely disabled 12-year-old daughter." A.A. Borovoy, "The
Perversity of Ottawa's Minimum-Sentence Move" The Toronto Star (28 December 1994) A23.
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Indeed, this article will argue that the circumstances of the Latimer
case provide a strong basis for proposing that the CininalCode should be
amended. Before looking at those recommendations, it is worthwhile to
pause and reflect on the genre of homicide represented in the Latimer case.
When one thinks of the nature of this killing, one should be reminded of
some basic doctrines. It will be argued that the killing of a child or person
with a disability should be considered an aggravating circumstance, from
the point of view of the charge laid or the penalty or both. Consequently,
there should be an increase in the general level of protection provided by
the criminal law, through the creation of new offences against children and
people with disabilities.
VIII. CONTRASTING RESPONSES TO CHILD HOMICIDE
Frequently, responses to the Latimer case have shown contempt for
what one would have thought were basic values and legal doctrines. The
conventional abhorrence of child killing is virtually forgotten. The betrayal
of trust by a parent in inflicting violence on a child is excised. Peters stated,
"the murder of a disabled child should have invoked siftjustice and strong
public condemnation." 69
The conspicuous failures to discharge the legal duties to provide the
necessaries of life as required by the Criminal Code (section 215), and to
ensure that medical treatment is provided and that the child is not harmed,
as guaranteed by child protection legislation, seem to go unrecognized. The
repackaging of the brutishness of an attack upon a person with a disability
who has communication problems and who is wholly dependant on her care
providers as compassion, love, or mercy is arguably the cruelest and most
insidious aspect of the case. Mariette Ulrich has captured the unsuitability
of such concepts for the context of murder, writing that:
"Compassionate Murder" is an o 'moron
The v ord compa qwn mean, "t
uffr vtth,"
and you can't suffer vith someone %ou'relhlling.
After all. hkml:wuals v-,enmn and
ethnic/racial minorities also suffer, don't they? Would an:.one ureit as a remcd the b
murdered?'

69

Supra note 22 at 639.
70 M. Ulrich, Latinernzav not Idke at, L't the cd,smop law autain umrdcrfiztshumnjusne 4
March
2001), online: Compassionate Healthcare Network <v, r. ehninternattonaLcom/
m_ulrichthejreport.htm>.
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Normally, society would find such actions so utterly reprehensible
and incomprehensible that the perpetrator would be denounced as a
monster or society would compartmentalize the killing as the action of a
person who must have been psychotic at the time of the offence. The typical
readiness to see the child killer as a moral pariah or as a person who has an
internal disorder indicates society's unwillingness to examine motive to
mitigate the condemnation attaching to child homicide.
The illogicality of a necessity defence, a constitutional exemption,
or a novel kind of less heinous homicide should be particularly plain when
one remembers other murders of children. For example, in 1995, Susan
Smith narrowly escaped the death penalty for killing her two healthy
children in South Carolina. Their 1994 drowning deaths were portrayed as
unthinkable crimes. "When Susan was arrested, angry and tearful mobs
gathered outside the courtroom."7 In Smith's case, the outrage was
"because those were 'valuable lives' snuffed out."72 "It is obviously the
disability of Tracy that most accounts for the difference in public
opinion." 73 Advocates for the accused in Latimer would no doubt try to
differentiate and ennoble his killing as being motivated by his inability to
tolerate his daughter's suffering, as opposed to the ostensibly more selfish
motive of the Smith case. Such distinctions seem insubstantial when one
sees the crime from the victim's perspective. None of these children wanted
to be killed. Their lives were terminated because of someone else's
problems with their existence.
Adam Hildebrand has consolidated and advanced our
understanding of why the killing of vulnerable people like Tracy seems to
take on such inverted dimensions."' He explains how language is used to
dehumanize people and how:
Unpleasant realities, such as killing thoughts and wanting someone dead, can be "prettified"
through what Wolfensberger has described as detoxification. Detoxification is the
manipulation of language which removes the poison from unpleasant realities by using words
that sound more palatable.'"

Frazee, supra note
35.
SLambeth. supra note 68.
73 Derksen, supra note
55.
74 A. J. Hildebrand, "Masked Intentions: The Masquerade of Killing Thoughts
Used to Justify
Dehydrating and Starving People in a 'Persistent Vegetative State' and People with Other Profound
Neurological Impairments" (2000) 16 Issues L & Med. 143.
75
Ibid. at 148.
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Through detoxification, differences betveen child homicides can be
created through not only the devaluation of the victim but also through the
benign colouration of motive, which is what occurred in Latimer. Such
discussions of diversions should not obscure the need for a direct
confrontation with the real problems raised by the killing of Tracy.
IX. ENVISAGING A DIRECT RESPONSE TO L4TIMER
What is the proper societal response to the conflict in the popular
presentation of these two instances of child homicide? Retreat and
pessimism would be counter-productive. Instead, this article favours a
positive approach, which is truly responsive to the challenges presented by
the Latimercase. Deborah Kaplan has advocated direct strategies, the goal
of which is to eradicate stigma, destroy stereotypes, and reduce
discrimination. "Social and legal activism that challenge the assumptions
behind disability discrimination," she wrote, "address the issues head on."'7
Margaret Thornton evokes Nietzsche's concept of ressentiment,
suggesting that "enduring a harm caused by the act of another triggers a
desire to retaliate by inflicting harm on the perpetrator in order that the
victim might lessen his or her own pain.""
When used in the context of discrimination, Thornton deploys this
spirit "as a positive force in reshaping the concept of citizenship,"'
promoting, as has Holloway Sparks, an ethic of "dissident citizenship" in
which the courage to stand up, speak out, and take an unpopular position
is shown to be productive and energizing."'
In this spirit of confronting the disability discrimination
demonstrated by Latimer and its public sequelae head on, Thornton's
evocation of ressentiment has inspired the presentation of the following
proposals. Of necessity, theywill be succinct, and intentionally provocative.
The appropriate ansver to the dangers exemplified in the Latimer
case is to amend the criminal law. The dignity and equality of people with
disabilities may thereby be reasserted. Society should be reminded of the
need to ensure that the most vulnerable people in our society (children and

76 D. Kaplan, "The Definition of Diability: Pcrspctie of the Dzability Communlty', $2" J 3
J. of Health Care L and Pol. 352 at 364.
77

M. Thornton, "Neo-Liberalism, Discrimination and the Polisof &scntrncn m
on Law andDisabil v in Australia (2000) 17 L. in Context 8 at 19.
78
70

lbid at 22.
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people with disabilities who have communication barriers and who are
dependant) require extra protection. Further, the basic principle that the
violation of a parental trust constitutes an especially heinous offence must
be reiterated.
In order to advance this discussion, this article will look at a series
of proposals to amend the CriminalCode and respond to some objections
to these recommendations.
X.

EXPANDING THE RANGE OF DISABILITY-SPECIFIC
OFFENCES

The Federal Department of Justice, albeit inadvertently, provided
a response to many of the issues arising out of Latimer through the federal
Justice Department's 1999 Consultation Paper on child victimization,
"Child Victims and the Criminal Justice System." ° A number of the areas
for consultation concerned the possibility of creating new child-specific
criminal offences. It seems equally appropriate to consider the
criminalization of similar behaviours with respect to persons with a mental
or physical disability, with an insistence upon a trust or dependency
relationship as explained infra. Both types of offences should be discussed,
based upon the facts of Latimer.
Parliament has already seen the need to provide special protection
for people with disabilities in a series of 1998 amendments to the Criminal
Code and other federal legislation."' Section 153.1 of the Criminal Code,
"Sexual Exploitation of Person With Disability," was created to prohibit
sexual touching of a person with a mental or physical disability by persons
in positions of trust or authority or with whom the person with a disability
is in a relationship of dependency. The provision was said to "ensure
comprehensive protection for the disability community against physical and
sexual violence," given that "the reality is, however, that the law has not
always recognized the special needs or circumstances of people with
disabilities."' The motivation which gave rise to this new offence should

80 Department of Justice Canada, Child Victims and the CriminalJustice System: A Consultation
Paper (November
1999),
online:
Department
of Justice Canada
<http//canada.justice.gc.calen/conschild/toc.html> (date accessed: 19 January 2001) [hereinafter
ConsultationPaper].
81 Department of Justice Canada, Backgrounder; Canada Evidence Act and Crininal
Code
Amendments to Accommodate Persons with Disabilities (June, 1998), online: Department of Justice
Canada <http:Ilcanada.justice.gc.calen/news/nrl1998/disabk2.html> (date accessed: 18January 2001).
82 Ibid.
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ensure that Parliament is able to consider widening the range of offences
intended to protect people with disabilities in the same manner proposed
in the ConsultationPaperon child victims.
It is beyond the scope of this article to explore in detail the full
range of offences discussed in the ConsuttationPaperor its counterparts in
the disability context. It does seem, however, that every potential expansion
of the range of Criminal Code prohibitions vs-h-As children deserves
parallel consideration for legislative activity vis-4t-vis persons vth
disabilities. For present purposes, offences are merely listed with
appropriate alterations to adapt their elements to the context of people
with disabilities.
In each case, in order to avoid both overbreadth and inaccurate and
paternalistic assumptions about the nature of disability, it would likely be
appropriate to incorporate the definitional structure of the current section
153.1 of the CriminalCode, which demands that the perpetrator be in a
position of trust or authority or be a person vith whom the person with a
disability is in a relationship of dependency.
i)

Crininalphysicalabuseofa person it ah a dasabi!, this offence v%,ould addresa the
harms which can be inflicted upon %ulnerable people by care prowaders.

ii)

Crininalneglect of a person itith a disalihav: this offence %ould b. directed to
forms of neglect which might not be co ered by other current offences against the
person, with an emphasis on %iolence.

iii)

Criminalemotionalabuse of a person s ith a disatdA, injuries suffered by Feople
with disabilities inflicted by persons in poitions of trust may not stop at phyc.cal
harm. Severe psychological and emotional damage may v, ll deserve separate
coverage.

iv)

Failing to report suspected crimes qqagnst persons %:dha disa,2:hA there is, in
general, no criminal law reporting requirement in Canada, despte the %anous
provincial offences penalizing the failure to reprt children or adults i need of
protection. Escalating the severity of failures to reprt by including them in the
CriminalCode v.ould enhance the protection offered by the law for 12r,- ns Vith
disabilities.

v)

Manslaughter-causingthe death ofa pcrson n;wh a dts.sataa arsing- cut efabuis or
ne31ect: this offence would not be intended to oust the offence of murder v-here
it can be proved. Instead, it would be designed to deal v,th the causation of death
through the above physical abue or neglect offences, vhich might draw the
public's attention to conduct that results in the death of a person with a disablhty.

XI. SENTENCING ISSUES
Outside the creation of these new offences, several major
sentencing issues should be addressed. There are areas involving basic
principles of sentencing, factors in sentencing, procedure in sentencing, and
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the actual punishment provisions of certain crimes which merit study by
Parliament, in order to properly respond to Latimer. For convenience,
existing legislation is reproduced, where applicable, with an asterisk
accompanying the recommended reforms, unless otherwise noted.
Judges have probably benefited from the recent guidance of
Parliament on the very basic issue of the purpose of sentencing. Inserting
an equality dimension seems consistent with this form of direction for the
judiciary.
A.

PurposeandPrinciplesof Sentencing

Section 718, a provision setting out the purposes of sentencing, was
included as part of amendments to the CriminalCode passed in 1995. That
section should be amended to underscore the importance of equality rights
of all citizens. The language I have proposed is italicized.
718.

The fundamental purpose of sentencing is to contribute, along with crime
prevention initiatives, to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just,
peaceful and safe society, where every individualis equalbefore and underthe law
and has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without
discrimination,by imposing just sanctions that have one or more of the following
objectives:

(a)

to denounce unlawful conduct;

(b)

to deter the offender and other persons from committing offences;

(c)

to separate offenders from society, where necessary;

(d)

to assist in rehabilitating offenders;

(e)

to provide reparations for harm done to victims and to the community;

(f)

to promote a sense of responsibility in offenders, an acknowledgment of the harm
done to victims and to the community."

This amendment would provide an additional description of
Canadian society and its aspirations. It presumes that Canadians believe
that equal protection and benefit of the law is as much a defining feature
of the country as being "just, peaceful and safe." It would require the judge,
when imposing sanctions, to take equality considerations into account. This
proposal might diminish the likelihood of a sentence such as the
constitutional exemption given for Latimer's second murder conviction,
which was either unmindful or reckless with respect to equality principles.
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OtherSentencing Principles:Section 718.2 et seq.

Other sentencing provisions should be considered in order to
provide explicit Parliamentary recognition of the special needs of persons
with disabilities and to provide a clearer demonstration of this
responsibility to the judiciary. Once again, the ConsultationPaperprovides
some inspiration for legislative action on the twin fields of children and
persons with disabilities raised in the Latinercase. Given the attention in
the ConsultationPaperpaid to "Sentencing to Protect Children '" this part
will concentrate on the utility of adopting similar initiatives for persons with
a disability in Canadian sentencing policy.
Section 718.2 already recognizes the aggravating effect of "evidence
that the offender, in committing the offence, abused the offender's spouse
or child"' or of "evidence that the offender, in committing the offence,
abused a portion of trust or authority in relation to the victim." ' Both of
these stipulations are directly engaged in the Latimer case, although, in
most discussions of the case, there have been few references to these
provisions, and some tendency to deemphasize their salience.
Although it is conceivable that these sections will be adequate to
deal with many scenarios, it would be more suitable to create separate
provisions which explicitly require that certain uinds of harms against
children and people with disabilities be considered in sentencing. Latimer
was a case where both interests were involved, as the victim was a child and
a person with a disability. In order to avoid the paternalistic conflation of
childhood and disability, distinct provisions should be created for each
segment of the population. In order to avoid duplication of the coverage of
child-related protections in the ConsultationPaper,the folloving proposals
will be phrased with exclusive reference to people with disabilities.
Arising out of Latimer,the sections would focus on: the relationship
between victim and offender; consideration of whether the dominant
sentencing principles should be denunciation, deterrence, and separation;
aclmowledgment that care providers will often have no prior record and a
good reputation; and the true harms experienced by a victim with a
disability. Although there are several parallel directive examples suggested

S4Department of Justice Canada, "Sentencing to Protect Childre n" in Chdd l7ttms
and the
CriinalJusice
SyterA ConsultationPapcr(Noiember1999), online, Department of Justice Canada
<http:lcanada.justice.gc.calenfcon-zchildfconsulhtml> (date accessed: 19 January 2U1 ).
85 Supra note 2,& 71S.2(a)(ii).
0

6Ibid.at. 718.2(a)(iii).
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in the ConsultationPaperfor adoption in relation to children, it should be
noted that the CriminalCode already has some comparable provisions. For
instance, section 743.6(2), which concerns delayed eligibility for parole,
establishes a hierarchy of principles in some situations:
... the paramount principles that are to guide the court under this section are denunciation

and specific or general deterrence, with rehabilitation of the offender, in all cases, being
subordinate to those paramount principles."

The following sections would provide Parliamentary leadership in
the protection of people with disabilities, while still preserving a large
component of judicial discretion, in the post-sentencing amendments
tradition:
Section 718.3 Provisions Relating to the Sentencing of Offenders Against
Persons with a Disability
(1)

In sentencing offenders against persons with a disability, the court shall take into
account the nature of the relationship between the offender and the victim,
including:
(a)

the nature of the trust reposed in the offender;

(b)

the extent of the dependence of the victim on the perpetrator;

(c)

the types of vulnerability of the victim within the relationship; and

(d)

any difficulties in communication which the victim experienced as a
result of his or her disability.

(2)

In sentencing offenders against persons with a disability, the court shall recognize
the seriousness of such offences for victims and society and shall consider whether
the principles of denunciation (s.718(a)), deterrence (s.718(b)) and separation
(s.718.(c)) ought to be the predominant objectives in all such circumstances.

(3)

In determining the applicable principles and objectives of sentencing, the court
shall determine whether the offender's community history, which may otherwise
be favourable, ought to be deemphasized, given the context of the offence against
the person with a disability.

(4)

In assessing the factors involved in the crime against the person with a disability,
the court shall examine the full range of harms inflicted on him or her and, in
particular, shall consider the physical, emotional, psychological, cognitive and
developmental injuries which may have been experienced by the victim.

The foregoing provisions would provide a clear statement of
Parliament's intentions with respect to the matter of sentencing offenders

87

Ibi. at s. 743.6(2).

20011

Latimer: Something Ominous is Happening...

who have committed crimes against persons with disabilities. The mixture
of general principles and specific factors to be considered by the judiciary
would have the same salutary educative and procedural effects as other
explicit Parliamentary declarations, such as the existing sentencing
principles in the Criminal Code or the preambles accompanying several
recent amendments.
C.

Victim Impact Statement

In the Latimercase, the father of the victim was the killer, while the
mother of the deceased has been entirely supportive of her spouse's
criminality. There was no victim impact statement, as those who would have
been defined as "victims" under the extended concept of section 722(4)(b)
of the CriminalCode, where the victim is dead, were not likely to comment
on the "harm done" or "loss suffered," pursuant to section 722(1).
Therefore, there was no one who would be able to bring the kind of
information normally contributed by a victim, or his or her survivors, to the
sentencing hearing. The Crown Attorney might address these issues in part,
but in most cases, would lack a prior involvement in the victim's life or a
close familiarity with the victim's disability and his or her needs and
characteristics.
The Criminal Code could be amended to address this lacuna,
although it should be noted that section 722(3) is already very expansive in
permitting "any other evidence concerning any victim." Statutory
accommodations could be provided to allow a victim's advocacy group to
accumulate and present a dossier on the actual victim of the crime where
there would otherwise be no voice for the deceased.
The accused's constitutional exemption at trial, as well as the
general judicial and public response to the killing, illustrated another
weakness in present sentencing policy and practices. An extreme level of
anxiety and fear among people with disabilities has been encouraged by
these events. The equality dimension of criminal law policy in the
sentencing process would be heightened were the above amendments to
section 718 to be accepted. In addition, it is worthwhile to consider
permitting evidence about the effects of a homicide on other citizens with
similar backgrounds or features. In the case of a murder where the reason
for the crime overlaps with the victim's disability, one might expect some
role to be played by, for example, the Canadian Association for Community
Living, the Cerebral Palsy Association or the CCD.
The necessary amendments to accomplish both types of changes in
the CriminalCode would be chiefly in respect of the definition of "victim"
under section 722(4). Subsection (c) infrawould respond to the situation of
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the normal spokespersons being unsuitable by reason of their (or an
associate's) criminality. Subsection (d) would address the need to provide

a role for representatives of other citizens who also may have been harmed
by the violence inflicted on the particular victim.
For the purposes of this section and section 722.2, "victim," in relation to an offence, means

D.

(a)

a person to whom harm was done or who suffered physical or emotional loss as
a result of the commission of the offence; and

(b)

where the person described in paragraph (a) is dead, ill or otherwise incapable of
making a statement referred to in subsection (1), includes the spouse or any
relative of that person, anyone who is in law or fact the custody of that person or
is responsible for the care or support of that person or any dependant of that
person."

*(c)

where the person described in paragraph (a) is dead as a result of a culpable
homicide committed by a person or persons who would otherwise be entitled to
prepare a victim impact statement pursuant to paragraph (b) and the Court has
determined that no other person listed in the subsection is able or suitable to
prepare a victim impact statement, means an association or representative so
designated for that purpose by the Lieutenant Governor in Council of the
province, on the recommendation of the Attorney General; and

(d)

where the person described in paragraph (a) is dead as a result of a culpable
homicide committed in whole or in part due to an immutable characteristic of the
deceased, including but not so as to restrict the generality of the foregoing, a
mental or physical disability, means a representative association, so designated for
that purpose by the Lieutenant Governor in Council on the recommendation of
the Attorney General, whose objects of association shall include advocacy on
behalf of the designated group.

First-DegreeMurder

Until the mandatory minimum penalty provisions are addressed for
all first-degree murder convictions, the Latimer case demonstrates that
there is a responsibility to expand the range of the existing provisions. In
terms of the conditions of eligibility for a first-degree murder conviction,
Latimer suggests that it is opportune to revisit the classification system.
Clearly, there were elements of planning and deliberation in the
accused's crime which could have amply sustained a conviction for the firstdegree murder offence with which the accused was first charged, so Latimer

88 Ibid., s. 722(4).
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does not oblige an alteration of this portion of the legislation.u Until the
general law of first-degree murder is liberalized, Latimer compels
reconsideration in respect of some of the other provisions of section 231.
Section 231(4) requires a first-degree murder designation where the
victim has a certain status within the criminal justice system, such as peace
officers, and was acting in the course of his or her duties when killed. The
section could be amended to expand the range of victims whose killing
would attract this additional penalty and vhich should comprise children
and people who are vulnerable and dependent as a result of a physical or
mental disability. The amendment would recognize the need to provide
additional protection for these victims and would highlight the increased
culpability that flows from a homicide involving these designated groups.
Similarly, section 231(5) refers to murder committed during the
commission of certain crimes as being first-degree. The list should be
expanded to include other crimes of domination, specifically those involving
children and people with disabilities. Each of the existing offences involves
extraordinary danger to a group of people who cannot escape from a risk
(section 231(5)(a), hijacking an aircraft); an overcoming and usurpation of
a citizen's normal autonomy (section 231(5), subsections (e) and (f),
kidnapping and forcible confinement, and hostage taking, respectively) or
extremely intrusive and damaging forms of interpersonal violence (the
three sexual assaults noted in the section). Killing a child or a vulnerable
and dependent person with a disability seems to belong in the same strata
of heinousness which the criminal law punishes harshly. Moreover, such
homicides can readily be seen as at least as damaging to the social fabric as
the present range of offences under section 231(5). The consequent
amendments would be:
(4)

Irrespective of whether a murder is planned and dehbrate on the part of any
person, murder is first-degree %.henthe %ictim is
(a)

a police officer, police co.nstable, constable, shenff, deputy shenif.
sheriff's officer or other riCrson emplo.ed for the presernation and
maintenance of the public peace. acting in the course of his duties,

89 The facts of Latimer,asdiscussed in the Supreme cQurt decision, emphattcallydemenstrate the
justifiability of a first-degree murder conviction in this cae. For example, Roach has observcd that the
accused's planning and deliberation in the case could hase resulted in a comtction for first-degree

murder. His e\planation of the conviction for second-degree murder seems sound, -The first lury's
acquittal of first degree murder may have been the result of jury nullification of a law that theybleshed
was too harsh." Supra note 20 at 471.
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(b)

a warden, deputy warden, instructor, keeper, jailer, guard or other
officer or a permanent employee of a prison, acting in the course of his
duties; or

(c)

a person working in a prison with the permission of the prison
authorities and acting in the course of his work therein;"

(d)

a child under the age of fourteen years; or

*(e)

a person, whether a child or adult, who is vulnerable and dependent
owing to a mental or physical disability.

(5)

Irrespective of whether a murder is planned and deliberate on the part of any
person, murder is first-degree murder in respect of a person when the death is
caused by that person while committing or attempting to commit an offence under
one of the following sections:
(a)

section 76 (hijacking an aircraft);

(b)

section 271 (sexual assault);

(c)

section 272 (sexual assault with a weapon, threats to a third party or
causing bodily harm);

(d)

section 273 (aggravated sexual assault);

(e)

section 279 (kidnapping and forcible confinement); or

(M

section 279.1 (hostage taking)"

.(g)

section 215 (duty of persons to provide necessaries); or

*(h)

section 153.1 (sexual exploitation of person with disability);

*(i)

a section that would include some of the new offences proposed
herein, involving children and people with disabilities: criminal physical
abuse, criminal neglect, criminal emotional abuse).

XII. CONCLUSION: THINKING ABOUT INCREASED
CRIMINALIZATION OF VIOLENCE AGAINST CHILDREN
AND PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES

The approach taken to the implications of the Latimer case in this
article will be troubling in an environment where there is justifiable

skepticism about conventional criminological perspectives on punishment
and especially on the morality and efficacy of minimum mandatory
sentences. While there are probably areas of intersection between my
general perspectives on these issues and those of others, especially
contributors to this special issue critical of mandatory minimum sentences,
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the Latimer case presents a point of departure which is very serious indeed.
This frequent commonality of aims between the author and contributors is
raised in order to engage the concept of restorative justice and critical legal
perspectives on crime, which would often pull the author's opinions in a
direction opposite to the ones expressed herein.
As Anthony Doob has observed in his discussion of public views on
sentencing policy, "people reject non-prison sanctions for certain types of
offences (e.g., serious violent or sexual offences) because these sanctions
are seen as not accomplishing denunciation. "' "
For the offence committed by Latimer, the premeditated killing of
a child with a disability who was dependent upon the perpetrator, there is
no place for discussion of restorative justice approaches to sentencing. In
the face of such brutality and continued self-justification by the offender,
extended imprisonment seems to be the only viable sanction. Hovever, it
must be acknowledged that, despite the patent difficulties presented by a
restorative justice option in Latiner,some observers would still attempt to
argue for its viability. For example, Tania Sarkar has suggested that "justice
would likely have been better served in Latimerhad such an approach been
employed." 93
Even Roach's careful portrayal of the "multiple faces of restorative
justice" in a recent article seems inadequate to refute the incongruity of this
approach in a scenario similar to Latimer. None of the rationales he
submits-restorative justice as "retributive accountability," "rehabilitative
healing," or "deterrent crime prevention"--speak to the nature and extent
of the violence in the Latimer case. Indeed, Roach's analysis of the
suspicions and hostility of feminists towards restorative justice could be
read, with appropriate revisions, to represent the views of people with
disabilities and their advocates after Latimer. Roach writes that "feminist
opposition to restorative justice could discredit it as a meaningful and nondiscriminatory response to serious crime."'
The challenging perspectives usually supplied by restorativejustice
frameworks have no relevance in assessing the implications of Latimer.

92 A.N. Doob, "Transforming the Punishment Eironment: Understanding Public VIeiins of
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People with disabilities will condemn any discriminatory reconsideration of
the penological status quo for the murder of a person with a disability.
Roach recognizes that "equality-seeking groups often line up on the side of
the criminal sanction" in their pursuit of "the equal protection of the
criminal law," although he argues that these same groups often "make
unrealistic assumptions about how much protection the criminal law
actually provides."" This skepticism is not misplaced at a general level.
When it comes to analyzing the efficacy of deterrence, it is clear that the
doctrine sometimes rests more on assumption than on evidence.
Nonetheless, it would be illegitimate to suggest that a realpolitikperspective
should be brought to bear concerning offences relating to people with
disabilities, while this influence is not seen elsewhere in drafting legislation.
In addition, Latimer may well be an instance where, had a sentence
intended to accomplish general deterrence been handed down in a previous
parallel case, the accused's crime may have been discouraged. Had Robert
Latimer known that a similar homicide had resulted in detection, vigorous
prosecution and the most serious of penalties, he might have been deterred
from killing his daughter. Given his attempts to avoid detection, his
frequent assertions that he has not committed a crime and his unwillingness
to accept the justice or inevitability of his life sentence, this hindsight seems
well founded.
Looked at another way, perhaps more paradoxically, the outlook on
the implications of Latimer espoused in this article still has progressive
potential, despite being rooted in traditional doctrine. As David Nelken has
said:
It remains to be seen, however, whether critical writers will agree that the main task of
criminal law is to serve as a restraint on power or whether they will also assign it a more
positive role in prefiguring and building a society based on less exploitative forms of social
relations."

A criminal law that is more respectful of the equality interests of
children and people with disabilities in dependent relationships will serve
as a more effective restraint on abuse of the power that adults and care
providers wield. Simultaneously, an acknowledgment of the duty to use
criminal law to protect vulnerable citizens in a manner which specifically
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contemplates their needs and aspirations presages a society which will be
less hierarchical, exploitative, and violent.
One need not become mired in what Klaus Liderssen calls "false
dichotomies"93 when considering the recommendations of this article.
LUiderssen points to the debate over whether the criminal law has social
steering functions. However, as he discusses them, both sides of this debate
seem consistent with new law-making activity on behalf of people with
disabilities. Criminal law may be restricted to exceptional cases, as one
hopes Latimer will remain, thereby minimizing its social steering role, but
requiring action nonetheless. Alternatively, the criminal law can be argued
to assist in a "positively formative"'" manner, again justifying many of the
proposals herein. Liiderssen's outlook on the other false dichotomy,
whether the law is oriented towards the victim or offender, would also seem
to permit, if not encourage, new criminal law in this area. As he explains it,
"the offender orientation was never an end in itself," as the concern has
always been to protect potential victims through the re-socialization of
offenders."'a
The foregoing recommendations provide some promise of
additional protection. On the other hand, the victim orientation, in
LUiderssen's conception, does not necessarily demand immediate severe
punishment. It does require the rule of law, which these proposals arguably
heighten rather than diminish, in the enhanced legal guarantees offered to
people with disabilities. Law reform on behalf of this stigmatized group of
Canadians should withstand the critics' gaze. Once again, Jones and Marks
seem to have captured the spirit which should animate new legal activity on
behalf of people with disabilities and should obliterate any timorousness,
writing that:
d ith esFenence of disabiity. La, cannot,
on its own, transform a society into one vhich fullyalues all its members. Ho;vc~r, in many
... law cannot dispel the pain that is often inol

ways law is as natural a site for the encounter ith disability as is medicine.'-'

The assumption that has been made throughout this article is that
anyone would be "hard-pressed to argue" that this "standard index crime"

93K. Liderssen, "Enlightened Criminal Policy or the Struggle Against Evirl2pm) 3 Buff Cnmo
LR. 637 at 695-96.
99 Ibid.
100 Ibid.
101 M. Jones and LA. Basser Marks, "Approaching Law and Disability"'(2r)
i at 3.
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of murder (afortioriof a child with a disability) is "in a practical or political
sense, problematically categorized as unacceptable," as Mark Kelman has
put it. t02 One cannot easily explain the conduct of Latimer, who may be
seen as part of a group of "relatively unremorseful violent criminals."" 3
Hildebrand's analysis may come as close as one is likely to get to
comprehending this offender, based upon existing data. He emphasizes
"the fear of human impairment-and the dread of profound neurological
impairment" as creating obstacles to recognizing true intentions. " He also
cites the "desire to see oneself as a good person" as "fertile ground for
repression, denial, revisionism, reinterpretation, confusion and selfdeception,""0 5 obscuring "the reality that good people are capable of great
evil."" ° All of these mechanisms may be at play, both for the accused and
his supporters.
Alternatively, Kelman's use of the concept of marginalization assists
in comprehending the sources of this accused's criminal violence. The
startling and chilling truth about the Latimer case is that it is by no means
clear that this accused's perspective is marginal. In fact, given much of the
public and judicial response to the case, it appears that this accused may be
all too well integrated into a culture which is deeply suspicious of and
hostile towards the differences of people with disabilities. This article has
endeavored to confront these discriminatory attitudes directly by trying to
use the criminal law as an equality-promoting device.
Latimer has been ominous for people with disabilities both in
Canadian law and in society. Some of the positions and amendments to the
CriminalCode advocated in this article may help to dispel the threatening
cloud that has formed as a result of this case. The legal and social
equilibrium created in the wake of Latimer should be unacceptable for all
Canadians. The criminal law should be used to try to counteract the
obvious dangers that the Latimer case and its aftermath have visited upon
people with disabilities. At the very least, Latimer should not be used to
intrude upon sentencing policies which seem to have been aptly invoked
against this accused.
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